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Abstract.We discuss robotic weapons, their advantages and disadvantages, and 
their effect on the way humans wage war. We consider the factors favoring the 
development of lethal robotic weapons that can operate autonomously.  We 
discuss the attempt to mitigate the dangers inherent in such weapons by means 
of an ethical controller implemented in software.  We conclude that this is 
impossible to achieve and therefore that autonomous lethal robotic weapons 
should not be developed. 
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1   Introduction 
In this paper, we argue that fully autonomous robotic weapons that have the capacity 
to kill should not be developed or deployed.  We begin with an overview of current 
robotic devices that are deployed or under development by the military.  We discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages that these weapons confer in combat and in the 
larger context of decisions to wage war and attitudes toward the conduct of war.  We 
consider the thorny problem of keeping humans “in the loop” in situations where 
these weapons are used with potentially lethal effects and discuss efforts to develop a 
so-called “ethical governor” to restrict the behavior of robotic weapons capable of 
autonomous operation.  We present an instructive example from the history of the 
Cold War that underscores the importance of human deliberation in situations of 
belligerent confrontation.  This example is followed by a discussion of the problem of 
responsibility and accountability as it applies to autonomous robotic weapons. We 
conclude with a section of general observations about the choices involved in opting 
to invest important material and human resources in the development of lethal 
autonomous weapons. 
 
2 An Overview of Robotic Devices in Use and Under Development 
 
We begin with a short discussion of the recent accelerated development of robotic 
weapons – unmanned ground and aerial vehicles (UGVs and UAVs) under the 
impetus of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Numbers tell at least part of the story.  
There were few of either type of system deployed in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  By 
2011, there were an estimated 12,000 UGVs and 7,000 UAVs in the inventory of the 
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U.S. military forces. Significantly, the U.S. Air Force currently trains more UAV 
operators than fighter and bomber pilots combined. [1] 
 Enemy deployment of IEDs in Iraq created an instant demand for Packbots – a 
ground-based, essentially defensive device developed by iRobot, the Boston-area 
company originally famous for manufacturing the Roomba robotic vacuum cleaner.  
The Packbot was used to detect and, if necessary, disarm IEDs without the risk of loss 
of human life.  Initially, it was simply thought of as a “mobile pair of binoculars.”  
With the addition of simple effector arms and grippers the Packbot acquired the 
capability to disarm and destroy improvised explosive devices concealed by the 
enemy. [2] 
 The initial problem addressed was that of locating and identifying non-human 
threats.  A related problem, of course, is the location and identification of human 
threats – enemy snipers. In this application, however, once a threat is identified, the 
next job is to eliminate it by killing the sniper.  Quite logically, a mobile device that 
carries a weapon in addition to its cameras provides the possibility of eliminating the 
threat by aiming and firing remotely under control of a soldier who does not have to 
appear in the sight of the sniper’s weapon.  Once again, the desire to shield one’s 
soldiers from situations in which their lives are at risk provides the incentive for 
development of a robotic device with additional capabilities.  As has often been 
observed [3], the desire to increase the killing effectiveness of one’s soldiers while 
increasing the distance between them and the enemy is a constant in the history of 
warfare.  So this was a natural application for Packbot, Warrior, its more heavily 
armed successor, and congeners such as the Talon and SWORDS devices 
manufactured by Foster-Wheeler, a second Boston-based robotics firm. In essence, 
arming the Packbot or similar robotic device is simply a next step in this historical 
process. 
 Not all UGVs have direct combat roles.  The special dangers of the role of human 
medics serving in battlefield situations has led to the development of a version of the 
Packbot that can search for wounded soldiers and provide a video feed that allows a 
distant human controller to deploy medical equipment on the so-called “med-bot” in 
order to evaluate and treat the wounded individual. [2] 
 UAVs have undergone a similar rapid transformation.  Perhaps the best-known 
UAV is the twenty-seven foot long Predator, capable of carrying out 24-hour 
reconnaissance and surveillance missions, returning high quality images day and 
night by means of normal and infrared cameras.  Furthermore, the Predator’s 
synthetic-aperture radar can provide valuable information even where the terrain is 
obscured by clouds, smoke, or dust.  As Singer notes, [t]he exact capabilities of the 
system are classified, but soldiers say they can read a license plate from two miles 
up.” [4].  The same logic that has driven changes in the design of UGVs has resulted 
in the arming of UAVs which now can carry out offensive missions under the 
direction of a human pilot or operator located thousands of miles away.  In addition, 
UAV technology has spread in both directions along the size and mission-length 
continua with the Raven (thirty-eight inches in length and ninety minutes in the air), 
the Wasp (fifteen inches in length, forty-five minutes of endurance), with micro-
UAVs the size of insects in the planning stage.  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
newer Reaper [get some specs if you intend to include this UAV in the discussion] 
and the Global Hawk (nearly forty-eight feet long with an endurance of thirty-five 
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hours) provides both wide-area search and high-resolution single target identification 
and has the capability of autonomous operation between the signals to taxi, take off, 
and land provided by its human operator. [4] 
 In addition to deploying its own force of UAVs, the U.S. Navy is also developing 
various types of unmanned surface and underwater vessels (USVs and UUV’s). [4] 
3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Robotic Weaponry 
It is not hard to see (and it is very hard to resist) the advantages of robotic weaponry.  
The first, and most compelling for an armed force possessing these weapons, is that 
they replace humans on the battlefield and therefore reduce the number of human 
casualties this force will sustain.  Beyond this, they are markedly superior to humans 
in what military strategists describe as the “three D’s” – situations that are dangerous, 
dirty, and dull. 
 Dirty environments include not only those, like desert battlefields affected by 
smog, smoke, sand and dust, but also those which have been contaminated by 
biological, chemical, or radioactive agents.  Robots have a very clear advantage in 
these environments where humans would be encumbered by bulky protective suits 
and related gear. 
Many military missions require concentration over long periods of time.  In 
addition to the physical stress of the activity, there is the psychological stress of 
paying steady attention in otherwise boring circumstances.  Humans can do this for 
limited periods of time and need downtime or pauses to recover the necessary level of 
acuity.  By contrast, robots don’t need to sleep, to eat, or to take a break for “rest and 
recreation.” 
The human body is limited in the speed and limits of reaction to threats and forces 
to which it is exposed in combat situations.  From g-forces acting on human pilots of 
advanced aircraft to speed of recognition and reaction to battlefield dangers, robotic 
systems appear to have a clear advantage.  As already noted, the first advantage of a 
robot in a dangerous environment is that its destruction involves the loss of a machine 
(although this may be more consequential if it falls into the hands of an enemy who 
can study and copy it) and not the loss of a human life. 
Related to these factors is calculation regarding risk.  Singer notes that, “The 
unmanning of [an] operation also means that the robot can take risks that a human 
wouldn’t otherwise, risks that might mean fewer mistakes.” [4]  He cites friendly fire 
incidents during the Kosovo campaign in 1999 in which the imperative to avoid loss 
of NATO pilots resulted in orders that planes not be flown at altitudes below 15,000 
feet.  One of the most grievous errors of this nature occurred when NATO planes 
flying at these altitudes bombed a convoy of buses carrying Kosovar refugees 
mistakenly identifying them as a convoy of Serbian tanks.  Singer also notes that the 
“removal of risk allows decisions to be made in a more deliberate manner than 
normally possible.  Soldiers describe how one of the toughest aspects of fighting in 
cities is how you have to burst into a building and, in a matter of milliseconds, figure 
out who is an enemy and who is a civilian.”  In this situation, a robot that can enter a 
room and shoot only at someone who shoots first has a distinct advantage over the 
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human who must take fire and somehow instantly manage to determine the source, 
return fire, and avoid hitting any civilians. [4]   
Another advantage that robots have in situations of combat is that they do not 
suffer from human emotions of rage against adversaries who have caused harm or 
death to a soldier’s comrades.  We know of many episodes where otherwise good 
individuals have given way to extreme emotion and committed atrocities after 
experiencing the loss of or grievous harm to someone with whom they have bonded 
and upon whom they have depended in situations of danger.  Surely eliminating the 
danger of such episodes is an important advantage favoring robotic agents over 
humans.    
With all these advantages noted, what could possibly be the downside of the use 
of robotic weapons?  These may be more subtle and harder to see but, in a certain 
sense, the disadvantages of these weapons are identical with their advantages.  One of 
these disadvantages, clearly recognized by those in command positions in the 
military, is that over a long time and haltingly we have negotiated barriers against 
barbaric behavior in war.  The Geneva Conventions and treaties barring the use of 
chemical and biological weapons are among these barriers.  When, however, one side 
in a conflict has such technological superiority, when there is marked asymmetry in 
the resources each brings to battle, there is an inescapable lessening of the respect that 
each side owes the other out of recognition of the parity of the risks the combatants 
share.  The sense that the weaker forces can be eradicated like insects by the “magic” 
of advanced technology acts, in a mutually reinforcing manner, on both sides to 
undercut the restraints erected against barbarity. [5] 
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of robotic weapons has to do with another 
set of barriers.  General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate forces in the 
American Civil War of the 19
th
 century once wrote, “It is good that we find war so 
horrible, or else we would become fond of it.” [3] The act of declaring war is or 
should be a grave existential decision for any country.  But we have seen, perhaps 
most notably in the case of the ill-considered invasion of Iraq by the United States, 
how consciousness of technological superiority lowers the barrier against waging war. 
Paradoxically, to the extent that atrocities committed by otherwise decent soldiers 
of our military remind us of the horror of war, they serve as a factor that should give 
pause to anyone contemplating “loosing the dogs of war.” 
4 Keeping Humans ‘In the Loop’ 
This section is the easiest to write and the most frightening.  When it comes to giving 
robotic weapons lethal capabilities, official military policy seems to be very clear and 
emphatic:  “Humans must be kept in the loop.”  The  meaning of this is, or should be, 
that a human must give authorization before any robotic weapon can fire on a human 
target.  In fact, however, whenever this matter is raised in serious discussion, the 
result is averted eyes and a change in topic.  The reasons for this are also clear.  
Although the ideal is to keep humans in the [command] loop, there are so many 
factors militating against this that in practice it seems impractical.  Why, if there is 
risk of loss of life on your side in the interval between identification of a lethal threat 
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and authorization to fire issued by a human controller, should the robotic weapon not 
be given the capability to fire immediately upon locating the threat?  Since the 
authorization requires communication between controller and weapon, and this 
communication can be cut or disrupted by the enemy, why should there not be an 
emergency back-up capability for the weapon to operate autonomously in this 
situation? 
Singer points out that the logic of human control of robotic weapons seems to 
demand a many-one correspondence between weapons and controllers.  But humans 
are notoriously ill equipped and unreliable for the task of controlling multiple units at 
one time, even under relatively calm conditions.  A Pentagon-funded report notes 
that, “Even if the tactical commander is aware of the location of all his units, the 
combat is so fluid and fast-paced that it is very difficult to control them.” [3] 
Further, as Singer points out, human control of automated weapons systems has 
already been seriously compromised by the human tendency to “believe what the 
computer says.”  The paradigmatic example of this is the case of the downing of Iran 
Air flight 665 over the Persian Gulf in July 1988 by an American naval vessel 
patrolling the gulf during the Iran-Iraq war.  Iran Air Flight 665 was an Airbus 
passenger jet on a commercial flight from Tehran, Iran to Dubai via Bandar Abbas.  
On the morning of the flight, the U. S. Navy guided missile cruiser, the Vincennes, 
equipped with the Aegis combat system, an integrated weapon control system that 
uses powerful computers and radars to coordinate, track, and guide weapons to 
destroy enemy targets.  Even though the passenger jet was climbing after takeoff from 
Bandar Abbas, flying a consistent course, and “squawking” the appropriate radio 
signal that proclaimed it to be a civilian airliner, the Aegis system radars on board the 
Vincennes seemed to identify the plane as an assumed enemy fighter jet on a 
descending attack profile.  Even though most members of the crew of the Vincennes 
and almost everyone on board its sister ships on patrol that morning were reading data 
that accurately identified the nature of the flight, not one of the eighteen sailors and 
officers of the Vincennes were willing to question the Aegis system’s apparent 
mistaken designation of an attacking enemy fighter aircraft.  As a result, the captain 
of the Vincennes, an officer with a known penchant for aggressive action, gave the 
authorization to fire resulting in the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655, killing all 290 
passengers and crew, among them sixty-six children. [3, 6] 
The problem with Singer’s analysis and the flaw in the conclusion drawn is that a 
software design or software-engineering error that should not have evaded the eye of 
even undergraduate software engineering students was one of the principal factors 
implicated in the mistaken characterization of flight 655.  In fact, in the process of 
coordinating data on the radars of the three ships in the patrol, a tag used within the 
previous hour to label a (friendly) fighter jet making a landing (thus descending) was 
reassigned as the label for Iran Air Flight 655 on the radars of the Vincennes. [6] So 
while it is not entirely inaccurate to think of this as an illustration of the way in which 
humans defer to the “judgment” of computer-controlled systems, it is far more 
relevant to see this as a warning against placing too much trust in the reliability of 
even state of the art software engineering. 
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5 Compensating for the Human ‘Out of the Loop’ 
If the superior capabilities of robotic weapons and the limitations of humans acting as 
controllers so far compromise the military principle of always keeping the human in 
the loop, then perhaps we can substitute an “ethical governor” implemented in 
software for the absent human controller.  Properly programmed, weapons acting in 
autonomous mode could perhaps be constrained to “act ethically in war,” observing 
all the articles of the Geneva Conventions, the laws of war, and, in the local context 
of the combat in which they are deployed, the relevant rules of engagement.  And 
since they are not subject to the psychological and emotional stresses that affect 
human combatants, we might even expect that they would act more morally than the 
human soldiers whose combat roles they assume. 
In fact, the NSF and U.S. government agencies associated with the Department of 
Defense have funded an initiative of precisely this nature.  Singer quotes the assertion 
of Ronald Arkin, a professor of computer science at Georgia Tech who has received 
support various agencies of the government for just such a project, “Ultimately these 
systems could have more information to make wiser decisions than a human could 
make.  Some robots are already stronger, faster, and smarter than humans.  We want 
to do better than people, to ultimately save more lives.” [5] 
In a recent paper, Gerdes and Øhrstrom discuss the possibility of devising a Moral 
Turing Test, which, in their words, “might enable us to distinguish principles for 
evaluating morally correct actions rather than (as in the original Turing test) skills of 
articulation.” [7]  Such a test would constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the development of what is referred to as an Artificial Moral Agent.  Their 
analysis, rooted in the work of the logician A. N. Prior [], leads to the conclusion that 
“Prior was right in claiming that the formulation of a formal system which correctly 
incorporates all aspects of moral reasoning would in principle require a complete 
description not only of all relevant moral rules and laws but also of all relevant 
aspects of the situation in question.  However, having such descriptions is tantamount 
to having a God’s eye view of all relevant aspects of reality.”  Although they 
conclude that it may still be “possible to formalize important aspects of ethical 
reasoning in a specific context and thereby contribute to a system which may pass a 
comparative Moral Turing Test,” I take their paper as indicating that even this partial 
approach to creating an Artificial Moral Agent represents a software engineering 
project of considerable difficulty and complexity.  Since the conditions of actual 
combat constitute a context of such fluidity and rapid change as to defy the simple 
description of “a specific [i.e., closed] context,” it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
the project envisioned by Arkin has an impossible goal.  The similarity of this case 
with that of the Strategic Defense Initiative (the so-called ‘Star Wars’ project) from 
which David L. Parnas withdrew in a well-known letter and series of critical papers 
[8] suggests that the appropriate response of computer scientists of good conscience 
toward Arkin’s project or any other claiming to have the purpose of devising an 
“ethical governor” for autonomous robotic weapons should be to condemn it.  
In this light, I think it is important to ask, “What is the purpose of the NSF in 
funding this “research?” Why should anyone want to do this?  One possible 
motivation is as a salve to the consciences of those who are participating in and 
drawing public funds from the Department of Defense and the National Science 
1678
Foundation in research that they know to be, in the last analysis, destructive and anti-
human.  We are building these lethal autonomous robotic weapons but they are going 
to be “stronger, faster, and smarter than humans.”  We are going to do better than 
mere humans and we will save many lives.  We believe (or convince ourselves that) 
we can achieve this chimera and therefore we must try (and, of course, inure 
ourselves to the burden of accepting the public’s money in furtherance of this 
grotesque illusion.) 
Again, I want to insist on the question, “Why should anyone want to do this?”  In 
the words of Joseph Weizenbaum, “Technological inevitability can thus be seen to be 
a mere element of a much larger syndrome.  Science promised man power.  But, as so 
often happens when people are seduced by promises of power, the price exacted in 
advance and all along the path, and the price actually paid, is servitude and 
impotence.  Power is nothing if it is not the power to choose.  Instrumental reason can 
make decisions, but there is all the difference between deciding and choosing.”[9, 
emphasis added]  What is it that we are choosing when we choose to develop the 
ability to make war in a way that is better than the way humans wage war? 
6 An Instructive Story 
As In mid-October of 1962, photographs taken during a U2 surveillance flight over 
Cuba revealed the presence of missile sites and Soviet missile components on the 
island.  Assurances given both by Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and 
Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, that no Soviet missiles would be 
installed in Cuba were thus revealed to be a deception.  This precipitated what was in 
all probability the most dangerous episode of the Cold War, a period of fifteen days in 
which the two superpowers were on a path to war that would have involved attacks 
using nuclear weapons by each on the other.  The consequences of this were and are 
unimaginable. 
In a chapter of the excellent book, Humanity:  A Moral History of the 20
th
 
Century, Jonathan Glover recounts the story of how Khrushchev and Kennedy 
managed to step back from the brink in spite of the strong forces – intense military 
competition, mutual suspicion and misjudgment, internal political pressures, the 
actions of military subordinates in the forces of both countries that exceeded their 
standing orders – that tended toward war and nuclear disaster. The conditions 
surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis enumerated by Glover recapitulate, in an eerie 
correspondence, the set of misjudgments, miscalculations, and reckless actions that in 
1914 led the European powers into a war that can only be considered a disaster for 
those who fought and for the generation that survived the conflict.  How, then, did the 
leaders of the two superpowers in 1962 avoid the trap?   It is a riveting and 
illuminating story worth the attention of anyone considering the role of autonomous 
weapons in war. [10] 
The story is riveting because this was a very close call.  There were pressures on 
both leaders – from both the political and military establishments as well as the Cuban 
leader Fidel Castro – to take actions (including on the U. S. side, an air attack and/or 
invasion of Cuba) which, with Soviet tactical nuclear weapons already deployed in 
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Cuba, would almost certainly have led to a catastrophic nuclear exchange.  Among 
the factors that appear to have prevented this, there were two that are worthy of 
reflection in the context of this paper. 
The first is that historian Barbara Tuchman had published earlier that year her 
study, The Guns of August, which carefully dissected European internal political 
pressures, misunderstandings in regard to treaty commitments, ambiguous signals, 
poor communication among allies and between potential belligerents, and the military 
preparations once begun that seemed impossible to roll back that led ineluctably to 
war and disaster for the continent.  Both President Kennedy and his closest advisors 
(including his brother Robert) had read the book and referred to it during the meetings 
at which the possible responses to the Soviet threat were discussed.  According to the 
memoirs of Robert Kennedy, quoted in Glover [10], JFK spoke with his brother about 
the European leaders in 1914 saying ”they seemed to tumble into war through 
‘stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, misunderstandings, and personal complexes of 
inferiority and grandeur.’  He said, ‘I am not going to follow a course which will 
allow anyone to write a comparable book about this time, The Missiles of October.  If 
anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every 
effort to give our adversary room to move.  I am not going to push the Russians an 
inch beyond what is necessary.’” 
Of equal weight, on the Russian side, Khrushchev, early in the crisis, sent a letter 
to President Kennedy in which he wrote:  “Should war indeed break out, it would not 
be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war.  I have taken part in 
two wars, and I know that war ends only when it has rolled through cities and 
villages, sowing death and destruction everywhere … If people do not display 
wisdom, they will eventually reach the point where they will clash like blind moles, 
and then mutual annihilation will commence … You and I should not now pull on the 
ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I 
pull, the tighter this know will become.  And a time may come when the knot is tied 
so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it, and then the knot 
will have to be cut.” [10] 
Both the words of Nikita Khrushchev and the import of Barbara Tuchman’s 
analysis that was present in the minds of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and his advisors 
resonated with the warning articulated by Robert E. Lee:  “It is good that we find war 
so horrible, or else we would become fond of it.”   This was a crisis that both leaders 
understood would forever indelibly bear their signatures, however it unfolded.  That 
personal sense of responsibility and the consciousness of the horrors of war were the 
factors that made it possible to pull back.  Let us imagine the computer system, 
designed and implemented by individuals without names and without the wisdom of 
those who read and reflect and are conscious of the horror, let us indeed pause and 
imagine the system capable of the saving wisdom of Khrushchev and Kennedy. 
7 The Question of Accountability and Responsibility 
The “Problem of Many Hands,” articulated by Helen Nissenbaum in her 1994 paper 
[11], has become a common-place, a cliché.  We cite this problem by name, nod 
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knowingly in acquiescence of the certainty that any large software engineering project 
is bound to have some unanticipated failure modes with serious negative 
consequences.  If, as is customary, the project is developed over a significant period 
of time by a team the membership of which is not fixed, it will be difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to determine who is responsible for the failure, to say who should be held 
accountable for harms ultimately engendered in the use of such a system.  This is just 
a fact of life in our technologically sophisticated world.  Get over it and move on. 
Perhaps we can agree that there are areas of application where the expectation of 
future benefits resulting from the development of a new technology justifies accepting 
the risks of such negative consequences – without, however, relinquishing the 
understanding that, while we are waiting for the realization of such benefits, someone, 
some organization must be held accountable and accept responsibility for these 
harms.  There are some areas of application where we can agree to take these risks.  
But there are assuredly areas where this attitude is unjustifiable.  The development of 
autonomous robotic killing weapons is one of them. 
Whose name will be on the disaster precipitated by the predictable malfunction of 
one of these weapons?  Whose name will be attached, as Khrushchev and Kennedy 
were aware theirs would beto the nuclear disaster precipitated by a reckless gesture in 
the course of the Cuban Missile Crisis?  Who will own the damage to what little of 
civilized culture we still imagine we possess?  Certainly not foolish and opportunistic 
computer scientists like Arkin, whose names will have long been forgotten.  In a 
sense, this is appropriate.  However much their work contributes to this damage, the 
disaster will be ours as a society if we do not recognize the folly of the path we are 
taking. 
8 Concluding Observations 
Finally, it is important to recognize that, although many profound thinkers have 
contributed to our understanding of what it means to act ethically, our ideas about 
ethical behavior are as much a product of our experience and our emotional wisdom 
as of our analytical intelligence.  Beware the scientist or engineer who claims that 
technique will substitute for human instinct and wisdom and enable us to program a 
machine to behave ethically.  Even to approximate this would require the solution of a 
software engineering problem of forbidding complexity.  A moment’s reflection on 
our discouraging experience with such systems should give us pause. [12] 
Long ago, Joseph Weizenbaum cautioned against the seduction of technique 
applied to problems for which its application is utterly inappropriate.  “There are two 
kinds of computer applications that either ought not be undertaken at all, or if they are 
contemplated, should be approached with utmost caution. …The first kind I would 
call simply obscene.  These are ones whose very contemplation ought to give rise to 
feelings of disgust in every civilized person. … I would put all projects that propose 
to substitute a computer system for human understanding for a human function that 
involves interpersonal respect, understanding, and love in [this] category. [9]  
Beyond this, in choosing to invest in the chimerical pursuit of the ability to build 
machines that can “do better than people” at waging war, we are distorting the 
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priorities on which a civilized society should rest. We seem unable to make a 
commitment to educating or providing adequate health care for all the children who 
live among us, but we find it easy to lavish great sums in the pursuit of an obscenity, 
oblivious to the warning, “It is good that we find war so horrible, or else we would 
become fond of it.” 
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